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CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OVER CIVILIAN COMPO-
NENTS AND ACCOMPANYING DEPENDENTS OF THE
ARMED FORCES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES
By CHARLEs V. STONE
The legality, constitutionality, and the wisdom, or lack of wisdom, of
the NATO Status of Forces Agreement' has been debated in the House and
Senate; 2 commented on in the daily newspapers and periodicals; mooted,
bruited, criticized and praised by statesmen and politicians, lawyers and
laymen alike. It has been characterized as a "great boon to our service-
men,"M and as "absolutely unthinkable."4 This Comment is not intended to
add to the storm of praise and abuse but rather to examine the statutory and
constitutional basis for criminal jurisdiction over civilian components and
accompanying dependents of the armed forces while stationed in friendly
foreign countries. Foreign court jurisdiction over military personnel will
be alluded to only as a background for a more complete understanding of
the Status of Forces Agreement as it is applied to those civilians accompany-
ing the armed forces.
Alternative Crintinal jurisdiction
Criminal jurisdiction over civilians accompanying the armed forces into
overseas areas is on an alternative basis. In countries which are not signa-
tories of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement or some similar agreement,
jurisdiction rests in military courts-martial pursuant to Article 2 (11) of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (1951).1 Article 2 (11) provides in part:
The following persons are subject to this chapter: ... (11) Subject to the
provisions of any treaty or agreement to which the United States is or may
be a party to or any accepted rule of international law, all persons serving
with, employed by, or accompanying the armed forces without the con-
tinental limits of the United States ....
In those countries that are signatories of the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement, jurisdiction may reside either in the national court of the par-
ticular country or in military court-martial according to the nature of the
offense.6 This jurisdiction is expressly vested by the terms of the Status of
Forces Agreement. 7
1 Agreement Regarding Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. 4 U.S.
Treaties & Other Int'l Agreements 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846 (cited in subsequent footnotes as
NATO SOFA). See also Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the
Agreement Regarding Status of Forces of Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty, 83d Cong.,
1st Sess., 97 et seq. (1953).
2 99 CoNG. REc. 9024-9083 (1953).
3 American Mercury, April 19, 1956, p. 111.4 1d. at 112.
5 64 STAT. 109 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 553 (1952). The Uniform Code of Military Justice
will hereinafter be referred to as the U.C.MJ. (1951).
6 NATO SOFA, Art. VII, 111 2-3.
7Id. at I1.
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Foreign Court Jurisdiction in the Absence of Treaty
It is axiomatic in international law that a citizen of one country who
commits a local crime in another country is amenable to the laws and the
courts of the latter. In the absence of treaty such a wrongdoer is not en-
titled to a claim of immunity due to his alien status. The United States gives
no protection to persons accused of committing local crimes in foreign
countries. The Status of Forces Agreement is an affirmation of this principle.
In contrast to the clear cut principles of international law regarding
sojourning civilians who run afoul of the law, there are as many differing
views on the status of an army while visiting a friendly foreign land as
there are armies. They range from the American view which favors a com-
plete immunity for the forces of the sending state, to the conservative
British view which has traditionally asserted that the receiving state retains
the right to punish offenses against its law, except for crimes committed
within a military installation.'
No international tribunal has passed upon the precise question of the
immunity enjoyed by friendly troops stationed on foreign soil. To resolve
these divergent views the NATO Status of Forces Agreement became a
necessity with American Forces and their dependents being based in
practically every country of the free world.
Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Status of Forces Agreement
The NATO Status of Forces Agreement is a multilateral reciprocal
treaty designed to implement the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty?
The Agreement was signed in London on June 19, 1951, and duly ratified
by the Senate of the United States on July 15, 1953.1" The purpose of the
treaty is to establish and set forth the terms and conditions that will deter-
mine the rights, duties, privileges and immunities of the forces of one
country sent into or stationed in the territory of another country, where
both countries are parties of the agreement."
Jurisdiction as to Persons
Article VII, paragraph 1, contains a basic grant of power and describes
the persons subject to the treaty provisions.
(a) The military authorities of the sending State have the right to
exercise, within the receiving State, all criminal and disciplinary jurisdic-
tion conferred on them by the law of the sending State over all persons sub-
ject to the military law of that State. This section is an implementation of
Article 2(11) of U.C.M.J., aforementioned.
8 For a comprehensive analysis of the American view, see 36 Am. J. INT'L L. 559; 40 id. 257.
For the British view, see Barton, Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity, 27 BitrIsH Y. B. Ixr'L L.
186. Barton concluded that members of visiting forces are completely subject to the jurisdiction
of the local courts and that any exception must be traced to express privilege or concession.
9 63 STAT. 2241, T.I.A.S. No. 1964.
10 See 99 Co-zG. RFc. 9088 (1953).
11 50 N.W. U. L. REV. 349, 350.
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(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall have jurisdiction over
members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with re-
spect to offenses committed within the territory of the receiving State and
punishable by the laws of that State.
Jurisdiction as to the Offense
Article VII (2) prescribes the circumstances under which the receiving
or sending State will have exclusive jurisdiction to try offenders.
(a) The sending State has exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject
to the military law of that State with respect to offenses punishable by the
law of the sending State but not by the law of the receiving State. An
example of this would be the failure to obey an order or regulation which
is a court-martial offense under Article 92 of the U.C.M.J.
(b) The receiving State has exclusive jurisdiction over members of a
force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offenses
punishable only by the laws of the receiving State and not by the laws of
the sending State. Traffic violations come under this category.
If an offense violates the laws of both the sending and receiving States,
both States may have jurisdiction.Y The State that has the right to try
the offender in the first instance is deemed to be the State having the "pri-
mary" jurisdiction and has the prior or superior right to try the offender.
This does not mean that the person will be twice put in jeopardy within the
same territory. Paragraph 8 of Article VII expressly provides:
Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provisions of this
Article by the authorities of one Contracting Party and has been acquitted
or has been convicted and is serving, or has served, his sentence or has been
pardoned, he may not be tried again for the same offense within the same
territory by the authorities of another Contracting Party.
Rules for the determination of which State has "primary" jurisdiction,
where jurisdiction is concurrent, are set out in Article VII, paragraph 3.
When there is concurrent jurisdiction the military authority of the sending
State shall have primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of a
force or of a civilian component in relation to:
(a) Offenses done in the performance of official duty.
(b) offenses solely against the property or security of the sending
State, or offenses solely against the person or property of another member
of the armed forces of the sending State or of a dependent.
In the case of any other offense the receiving State shall have primary
jurisdiction."3 The last provision has prompted the Bricker Amendment1 4
12 NATO SOFA, Art. VII, f 3.
13 Id. Art. VII, ff 3 (c).
14 See 99 CONG. Rac. 4818-34 (1953) ; 99 id. at 9024-83 (daily ed. July 14, 1953) ; 99 id. at
9086-93 (daily ed. July 15, 1953). Senator Bricker proposed a reservation to the Agreement
which provided that the military authorities of the United States should retain exclusive juris-
diction over members of its force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to
all offenses committed within a receiving State.
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and the controversy referred to above. The opponents of the Agreement
claim that Article VII has ceded American sovereignty.
Not in all cases though, will the State having primary jurisdiction pro-
ceed to bring the offender to trial. The Agreement makes provision for a
waiver of jurisdiction. 5 If the State having primary right to jurisdiction
decides not to exercise its right, it must notify the authorities of the other
State as soon as is possible. If this is done, then the State of secondary
jurisdiction may prosecute.
A State having primary jurisdiction may receive a request from the
other State for a waiver of its right to try the offender and
... the authorities of the State having the primary jurisdiction shall give
sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other
State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers
such waiver to be of particular importance. 16
Such waivers are granted in the majority of the cases where requested
by American military authorities. In over 90% of the cases of off-duty
offenses the receiving State has waived jurisdiction. 7
Procedural Aspects of the Agreement
If tried by the receiving State the accused will be tried according to
the laws of the receiving State. Apart from this, paragraph nine of Article
VII sets forth specific procedural safeguards that must be afforded the
accused:
ARTICLE VII
9. Whenever a member of a force or civilian component or a de-
pendent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be
entitled-
(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or
charges made against him;
(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
if they are within the jurisdiction of the receiving State;
(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defense or to
have free or assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing
for the time being in the receiving State;
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent
interpreter; and
(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the
sending State and, when the rules of the court permit, to have such a rep-
resentative present at his trial.
The foregoing sets out, in the main, the provisions of the Status of
15 NATO SOFA, Art. VII, IT 3 (c).
16 Ibid.
17 18 JAG J. 15, 16.
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Forces Agreement treating with criminal jurisdiction over civilian com-
ponents and dependents. As pointed out previously, foreign court jurisdic-
tion over civilians has always been undisputed. The rights of civilians
covered by the Status of Forces Agreement have been more fully protected
through the procedural safeguards embodied in the agreement.
Questions of the constitutionality of Article VII are raised by the pro-
visions of the agreement which allow the sending State to exercise court-
martial jurisdiction over the accompanying civilians when the offense is
purely military or when the receiving State has waived jurisdiction. This
might appear to be an original grant of power to the military authorities
over accompanying civilians except that paragraph 1(a) of Article VII
limits coverage of the agreement to "persons subject to military law of
that State..."
Criminal Jurisdiction Under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice
Where jurisdiction has been waived by the receiving State and in coun-
tries which are not signatories of the Status of Forces Agreement or some
similar agreement, criminal jurisdiction over accompanying civilians is
exercised by the military forces under the provisions of U.C.M.J. (1951).
The Supreme Court of the United States in two decisions handed down
last term, Kinsella v. Krueger' and Reid v. Covert,," proved Col. Win-
throp, eminent authority in military law, to be a poor prophet. Col. Win-
throp wrote in 1895:20
"The provisions of... statutes.. . so far as they subject civilians to trial
by court-martial are in the opinion of the author, clearly unconstitutional
... in his judgment, a statute cannot be framed by which a civilian can
lawfully be made amenable to the military jurisdiction in time of peace."
Mesdames Smith and Covert were tried by military court-martial;
pursuant to statute; 21 were convicted, and their convictions sustained by
the United States Supreme Court.
Before examining the decisions of the Supreme Court in the S'mith and
Covert cases an inquiry should be made into the precise constitutional
questions presented by court-martial jurisdiction over civilians.
Constitutional Law and Court-Martial Jurisdiction
The constitutional question presented can be stated as follows: Under
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution the accused is assured of the
right to a public trial by an impartial jury; this right carries with it under
the Fifth Amendment the protection of a presentment or indictment by a
18351 U.S. 470 (1956).
19351 U.S. 487 (1956).
2 0 WILTAm WINmnop, mI=ARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2d ed. 1920), 93, § 123.
2164 STAT. 109 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 553 (1952).
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grand jury. These rights are fundamental to trial by a lawfully constituted
civilian court. The question is then posed, if jurisdiction over civilians is
vested in military court-martial, what is the constitutional authority for
the jurisdiction and what are the limitations?
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution grants to Congress power to
"make rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces." This is the fundamental source for the grant of court-martial
jurisdiction to the military. The Fifth Amendment expressly excludes
"cases arising in the land and naval forces" from its scope. "These pro-
visions show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial of military
offenses in the manner then and now practiced by civilized nations, and that
the power to do so is given without any connection between it and the
Third Article of the constitution defining the judicial power of the United
States, indeed that the two powers are entirely independent of each other."2
This independent power must be looked to in determining whether court-
martial jurisdiction is present, if either civilians or military personnel are
on trial.
Court-martials are convened within the jurisdiction of military law and
are purely creatures of statute;23 with only special and limited jurisdic-
tion.24 They must be convened and constituted in entire conformity with
the provisions of the statute or else the body is without jurisdiction.25
Where justification is found for trial by court-martial it is not within the
province of civil courts to interfere; but, if the military tribunal is brought
into being without any basis in law or fact, civil courts must grant relief.26
Court-Martial Jurisdiction as to Persons
Unlike civil courts where, usually, the locus of the offense is all-impor-
tant and the status of the accused is of secondary importance, under military
law the reverse is true. Code provisions as to what persons in what status
at what time are subject to military law are detailed and, broadly stated,
cover military, quasi-military, and limited classes of civilians.
Congress, in its lively concern for the basic American principle of
separation of powers in government, seems to have limited the peacetime
jurisdiction of military tribunals over civilians to necessity situations; such
as where the civil courts are not functioning, or where; by reason of location
or due to accepted principles of international law or of treaty provisions,
no American civil court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the cause.
Congress, in modeling American military law on that of the British,
originally extended court-martial jurisdiction only over members of the
armed forces and over such civilians as were serving in quasi-military
2 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 839 (1858).
2 Wade v. Hunter, 72 F. Supp. 755 (F. D. Kan. 1947).
2 Rosborough v. Rossell, 150 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1945).
25 Ex parte Duncan, 66 F. Supp. 976 (D.C. Hawaii, 1944) ; Ex parte White, 66 F. Supp.
982 (D.C. Hawaii, 1944).
26 Ibid.
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capacity with troops in the theater of war, such as teamsters, watchmen,
telegraphers and contract surgeons.17 Non-military crimes by soldiers and
civilians alike were dealt with by surrendering the accused to civil authori-
ties.as8
In the 1916 revisions of the Articles of War, Congress included another
class to the civilian component of the Army subject to military law, viz,
"persons accompanying the armies of the United States." 9 This revision
replaced the old Article of War 63, and formed the basis for Article 2 (11)
of U.C.MJ. (1951). The 1916 change was adopted because the then
existing provisions of the old Article of War 63 were defective in that they
did not permit the disciplining of retainers, persons accompanying and per-
sons serving with the armies in time of peace in places to which the civilian
jurisdiction of the United States did not extend and where it was contrary
to international policy to subject such persons to the local jurisdiction,
and where, for other reasons, the law of local jurisdiction was not appli-
cable, thus leaving those classes practically without liability to answer
for their unlawful acts.30
Congress in 1943 expanded the application of the Articles of Govern-
ment for the Navy to meet war-time conditions so as to subject to military
law and trial by naval court-martial civilians serving with or accompanying
naval forces who were either outside the territorial jurisdiction of federal
courts or at a great distance from such courts.3'
In the U.C.M.J. enacted in 1950, Congress adopted this 1943 expansion
of jurisdiction and made it applicable in peacetime as well as war time, and
thus made subject to military law, and to the jurisdiction of court-martial
persons "employed by" as well as "those serving with" or "accompanying"
the armed forces. Also, the territorial limitations on court-martial jurisdic-
tion during peace-time were reduced to territories or parts thereof where
the civil courts system was not readily available.
It took Congress from 1775 to 1951 to grant to the military the juris-
diction to try by court-martial a restricted class of civilian whose presence
with the military materially affects the efficiency and morale of the armed
forces: the families of the servicemen who accompany them on assignments
to overseas areas. It is apparent from the discussions in the sub-committee
of the Armed Service Committee, that Congress intended Article 2(11)
27 Article of War 63. Rev. Stat. § 1342 (1874). (Later repealed by (36 Stat. 619 (1916),
104 U.S.C. § 1473 (1916)). "all retainers to the camp, and all persons serving with the Armies
of the United States in the field, though not enlisted soldiers, are to be subject to orders,
according to the rules and discipline of war."
28 Winthrop, op. cit. supra n. 20, at § 98.2 9 Artide of War 2 (d), 36 STAT. 619, 10 U.S.C. § 1473 (1916) "... all persons accompany-
ing or serving with the armies of the United States, and in times of war all such retainers
and persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States in the field, both
within and without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States... "
30 S. REP. No. 130, 64th Cong., Ist Sess., Transcript annexed 30, 37, 38 (1916).
3 1 SNEDEKER, MILITARY JUSTICE UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE, § 713, p. 153 n. 280.
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would render these dependents subject to military law and trial by court-
martial; and that this jurisdiction should exist in peace as well as in war.32
Judicial Authority on the Amenability to Trial by Court-
Martial of reAccompanying Civilians"
Prior to the 1916 revision of the Articles of War, civilians accompanying
the armed forces in foreign countries were not subject to military law, and
there was little significant judicial authority relating to the exercise of
court-martial jurisdiction in peacetime over such accompanying civilians.
The specific problem of military jurisdiction over accompanying dependents
did not arise until after the close of World War II and the constitutional
issues were never directly raised before that time.
Article 2 (d) was never ruled on directly by the Supreme Court of the
United States but the language of the Court in Madsen v. Kinsella3 was
favorable to the constitutionality of 2 (d). In the Madsen case the Supreme
Court found that the wife of a serviceman who lawfully entered the Ameri-
can Zone of Occupied Germany in 1949 with her husband, Lt. Madsen of
the USAF, and who was residing with her husband when she shot and
killed him, was a person "accompanying the armed forces" and was sub-
ject to military law under the 1916 revision of the Articles of War.
Since the enactment of the present Uniform Code of Military Justice
there have been a number of cases before the Boards of Review of the
military services and before the Court of Military Appeals in which Article
2(11) has received construction. Two of these cases have reached the
Supreme Court of the United States where the constitutionality of 2 (11)
was affirmed.34 These two cases are worthy of detailed examination.
The Covert Case
Mrs. Covert, the wife of a member of the United States Air Force, was
transported to England as a dependent pursuant to military regulations.
Mrs. Covert resided in public quarters assigned to her husband and re-
ceived commissary and other privileges. On the 10th of March, 1953, Mrs.
Covert "hatcheted" her husband to death. Under an agreement between
the United States and Great Britain,35 which provided the armed forces
of the United States with exclusive criminal jurisdiction over members of
the armed forces thereof and their dependents, she was subjected to trial
by general court-martial and convicted of homicide.
The Board of Review in affirming the conviction"6 held that a wife who
3 2 H. REP. No. 491, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949) ; S. REP. No. 486, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
7-8 (1949).
33 343 U.S. 341, 361 (1952).
34 See notes 18-19 supra.3 5 Visiting Forces Act of 1942, 5 & 6 Geo. 6, c. 31. This act has since been replaced by
the Visiting Forces Act of 1952, 15 & 18 Geo. 6, 1 Eliz. 2, c. 67, the British implementation of
the Status of Forces Agreement.
36 16 C.M.R. 465.
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accompanies her husband to, or joins him at his duty station in a foreign
country, is a person "accompanying the armed forces of the United States"
within the meaning of Article 2 (11), and consequently the court-martial
which convicted her was with jurisdiction.
In answer to defense counsel's contention that the accused was denied
due-process, the court answered:
"... counsel's contention ... may be answered by a simple restatement of
the often quoted phrase that in the military or naval services of the
United States, trial by military tribunal is due process... it necessarily
follows from our determination that the accused was subject to trial by
court-martial, that no presentment nor indictment by grand jury... was
required."37
Mrs. Covert was returned to the United States and confined in the
Federal Reformatory for Women, Alderson, West Virginia. On appeal,
the United States Court of Military Appeals set aside her conviction, on
grounds not material here,88 and she was transferred to the District of
Columbia jail to await a rehearing by court-martial at Bolling Air Force
Base, Washington, D.C. While there she filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia,
alleging that she was not subject to court-martial jurisdiction because Ar-
ticle 2(11) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice was unconstitutional.
She also contended that whatever jurisdiction the military may have had
to try her by court-martial under Article 2 (11) was lost by her return to
the United States and delivery to the custody of civilian authorities. The
District Court ordered the writ to issue,39 and the Government appealed
directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court
postponed 0 the question of jurisdiction until a hearing was had on the
merits and scheduled the case for argument with Kinsella v. Krueger.
Reid v. Covert was considered by the Supreme Court as a companion
case to Kinsella v. Krueger. The Supreme Court, in reversing the District
Court of Columbia, held that Mrs. Covert was continually under military
jurisdiction; even during the time she was awaiting a rehearing after her
sentence was set aside. The military courts have recognized rehearings to
be but continuations of the original proceedings.4 "Military jurisdiction,
once validly attached, continues until final disposition of the case."' ' Mrs.
Covert's principal contention on the merits was answered by the court's
decision in Kinsella v. Krueger.
37 16 C.M.R. 465, 475.
3819 C.MYL. 175.
39 U.S. exrel. Clarice B. Covert v. Curtis Reid, Superintendent, 24 U.S.L. Week 2238
(D.D.C. Nov. 22, 1955).
40 350 U.S. 985 (1955).
41351 U.S. 487, 491 (1956).
42 Id. at 492.
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Kinsella v. Krueger
In October of 1952 in occupied Japan, Dorothy Krueger Smith killed
her husband, an Army Colonel, in their military residence in Tokyo. An
Army general court-martial convicted her of premeditated murder and
imposed a life sentence which action was affirmed by the Board of Re-
view. 3 It was seriously contended by her defense counsel that the accused
upon the death of her husband ceased to be a dependent and so at the
time of the trial was not subject to court-martial jurisdiction, no longer
being a person "accompanying the armed forces." In rejecting this conten-
tion the Board of Review relied on the Madsen case, and said Mrs. Smith's
dependent status did terminate upon her husband's death, but, she re-
mained a person "accompanying the armed forces . . . "within the meaning
of the U.C.M.J. (1951). The true test, the court held, is whether the person,
when tried, is still accompanying the armed force of the United States,
regardless of a prior change in status. The court discussed several cases
having to do with civilians who were tried by court-martial after having
terminated their employment with the armed forces, and then concluded,
"We perceive no distinction between termination of employment and
termination of marital status by reason of the death of a spouse in the
military service. "" The accused entered Japan solely because of her marital
status upon invitation of the United States and with permission of Japan.
The Army was responsible for her throughout her stay in Japan and pro-
vided her with all the necessities of life. The accused was not allowed to
merge with the civilian population upon the termination of her dependent
status but was immediately taken into custody. For these reasons Mrs.
Smith was considered to have continued a person "accompanying the
armed forces."
Mrs. Smith's conviction was affirmed by the Court of Military Ap-
peals;45 and like Mrs. Covert she was returned to the United States and
began serving sentence in the Federal Reformatory for Women, Alderson,
West Virginia. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed on Mrs.
Smith's behalf by her father, General Walter Kruger, U.S. Army, retired.
The petition alleged that the court-martial had no jurisdiction to try Mrs.
Smith because Article 2 (11) of the U.C.M.J. (1951) violates both Article
III, section 2, and Amendment VI of the Federal Constitution, which
guarantees the right to trial by jury to a civilian. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of West Virginia issued a preliminary writ.
After a hearing, which included the submission of briefs and unlimited
oral argument, the writ was discharged and Mrs. Smith was remanded to
the custody of the Warden. 6
The decision of the District Court of Columbia is of particular interest
43 10 C.M.R. 350.
44. 10 C.M.R. 350, 363.
45 17 C.M.R. 314; 5 USCMA 314.
46137 F. Supp. 806 (S.D. W. Va., 1956).
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and is presented in some detail here because it contains the only searching
inquiry into the constitutionality of Article 2 (11) that can be found. When
Mrs. Smith's case eventually reached the Supreme Court of the United
States, court-martial jurisdiction was sustained on the basis of procedural
convenience without a close examination of Article 2 (11).
In argument before the United States District Court counsel for peti-
tioner admitted that the effort to secure release on habeas corpus stemmed
from the recent decision of the Supreme Court in U.S. ex rel Toth v.
Quarles,47 and the action of the District Court of Columbia in freeing Mrs.
Covert. The district court distinguished the Toth decision and the action of
the court in the Covert case on the grounds that:
(1) Toth was a civilian residing in the United States when the charges
were made.
(2) The Toth decision turned on the right of a person to claim the
protection of those constitutional guarantees which secure to persons ac-
cused of crime in this country the traditional safeguards which accompany
every criminal trial in the civil courts.
(3) Mrs. Covert, though convicted overseas, had her conviction re-
versed after her return to the United States and was no longer a person
"accompanying the armed forces." (The court declined to comment on
the merits of the Covert release.)
Mrs. Smith's situation differed in two significant respects from Toth:
(1) She was not living in the United States, nor present there when
she was charged with the murder of her husband;
(2) She was connected with the army as a person "accompanying the
armed forces without the continental limits of the United States;" both
when she committed the act and when she was arrested and tried for it.
The court then turned to a careful examination of Article 2(11) to
determine the jurisdiction of the court-martial.
4 7 350 U.S. 11 (1955). The Toth case became a cause celebre when military authorities
apprehended Toth, an honorably discharged serviceman, and returned him to Korea to
stand trial by court-martial, as a civilian, for the accused murder of a Korean national.
While the accused was being held pending investigation, his sister filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The ac-
cused was returned from Korea, a hearing was held, and he was released. On appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia by the Secretary of the Air
Force the District Court was reversed and Toth was remanded to custody. On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court again reversed the case. The Air Force based jurisdiction
on Article 3(a) of the U.C.MJ. (1951) Article 3(a) grants to military and naval authorities
a continuing court-martial jurisdiction over one who was once subject to the U.C.M.J. (1951)
even after that person has severed all connections with the service. The jurisdiction is lim-
ited to crimes committed while the person was subject to the U.CM.J. (1951) and punish-
able by five years or more and for which the person could not be tried in any State or
Federal court. The Supreme Court of the United States declared Article 3(a) to be uncon-
stitutional unless it was enacted pursuant to authority granted by some provision of the
Constitution. The Court held that it was clear Article III did not confer such authority.
The Court then looked to Article I, section 8; "The Congress shall have the power. .. (14)
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.' The
majority concluded that Article I of the Constitution was not broad enough to sustain Article
3 (a) of the U.C.M.J. (1951).
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Article 2 (11 ) is not limited to a time of war or to the field of action.
It purports to extend the coverage of the Code of Military Justice (and
hence the jurisdiction of court-martial) to all persons 'accompanying the
armed forces' abroad. This coverage, however, is conditional. If some
treaty or agreement to which the United States is a party are applicable to
a particular case, then by its own limitation Article 2 (11) does not come
into play ... By an administrative agreement ... the Japanese Govern-
ment ceded to the United States, through its military courts and authori-
ties, all jurisdiction to try offenses committed in Japan by dependents of
members of the armed forces ... Had this treaty been in effect at the time
Article 2 (11) of the Code of Military Justice was enacted, it might be cited
as the source of Congressional power to pass this act; but it would scarcely
be contended, I think, that a piece of legislation, if it were void for lack
of constitutional authority when passed, could be validated by a later
treaty, even though Congress might subsequently act freely in that field.
However the treaty did remove the limitations which in its absence would
have prevented Article 2 (11) from taking effect, in that upon the ratifica-
tion of the treaty there was no longer any 'accepted rule of international
law' or any treaty to the contrary which interfered with its operation. 48
The court concluded:
"I cannot say with certainty that the power of Congress to provide for
court-martial discipline of these civilians ... is not necessarily and prop-
erly incident to the express power 'To make Rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval Forces' . . . I must uphold Article
2(11) of the Code of Military Justice in its entirety." 49
The Government sought certiorari while an appeal was pending and
the United States Supreme Court granted review' . . . "because of the seri-
ous constitutional question presented and its far reaching importance to
our Armed Forces stationed ... throughout the world."'
In Kinsella v. Krueger the Supreme Court, after determining that Mrs.
Smith came within the terms of Article 2 (11), limited its determinations to
... "whether the civilian dependent of an American serviceman authorized
to accompany him on foreign duty may constitutionally be tried by an
American military court-martial in a foreign country for an offense com-
mitted in that country."52
The court directed its first inquiry to the question, whether, as a matter
of constitutional right, an American citizen outside of the continental limits
of the United States and in a foreign country is entitled to trial before a
48 137 F. Supp. 806, 810 (S.D. W.Va., 1956). The agreement the court made reference
to may be found in 3 U.S. Treaties & other Int'l Agreements (Part 3) 3346, 3353-3356,
T.I.A.S. No. 2492. This Security Treaty between United States and Japan was amended
by 4 U.S. Treaties & other Int'l Agreements 1847, T.I.A.S. No. 2848. As amended the criminal
jurisdiction provisions are substantially identical with those of the Status of Forces Agree-
ment.
49 137 F. Supp. at 811.
50 350 U.S. 896 (1955).
51351 U.S. 473 (1956).52 Id. at 474.
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federal court for an offense committed within that country. The question
was answered in the negative. Congress may establish legislative courts
outside the territorial limits of the United States proper and the procedure
in such tribunals need not comply with the standards prescribed by the
Constitution of the United States for federal courts under Article III of
the Constitution. In these legislative and consular courts, pursuant to
treaty, American citizens may be tried for local offenses.
"The power to create a territorial or consular court does not preclude, but
must necessarily include, the power to provide for trial before a military
tribunal unless that alternative is so clearly arbitrary or capricious that
legislators acting rasonably could not have believed it necessary or
appropriate for the public welfare."53 .
The Court, having determined that one in the circumstances of Mrs.
Smith could be tried before a legislative court established by Congress,
declined to examine the power of Congress "To make Rules for the Gov-
ernment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces" under Article I of
the Constitution. "If it is reasonable and consonant with due process for
Congress to employ the existing system of courts-martial for this purpose,
the enactment must be sustained."54
The Court found it not unreasonable for Congress to conclude that
both military personnel and civilian dependents should be governed by the
same legal standard to the end that they receive equal treatment under the
law. The destruction of effective law enforcement in overseas areas might
result from the unrest and confusion that would accompany a double
standard of courts for civilians and the armed forces, according to the
majority opinion of the court.
The Court could find no constitutional bar to the power of Congress
to enact Article 2 (11) and the judgment of the lower court was sustained
by a close margin. Chief Justice Warren, Justice Black and Justice Douglas
dissented. The dissent, for lack of time, was not filed with the majority
opinion; but will be filed in the present term of court. Justice Frankfurter
wrote a reservation which was in the nature of a dissent.
Conclusion
As suggested by the foregoing there are few difficulties presented in the
exercise of foreign court jurisdiction over sojourning civilians; the provi-
sions of the Status of Forces Agreement in this respect are consistent with
well established principles of international law. Difficulties are encountered
when we consider court-martial jurisdiction over the accompanying de-
pendent. That these difficulties are not easily resolved was reflected in the
majority opinion of Kinsella v. Krueger and in the procrastination of the
dissenting members of the Court. The uncertainty of the Court was indi-
53 Id. 478.
54 Id. at 476.
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cated on the first day of the present term when the Justice Department
was asked to give a ruling on the amenability of accompanying dependents
to court-martial jurisdiction.
In the words of Justice Frankfurter, "Time is required not only for
the primary task of analyzing in detail the materials on which the court
relies. It is equally required for adequate reflection upon the meaning of
these materials and their bearing on the issues now before the court.
Reflection is a slow process. Wisdom, like good wine, requires maturing." 55
55 Id. at 485.
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